Abstract Due to negative consequences of climate change for agriculture and food production shocks affecting different areas of the world, the past two decades saw the conditions of global food security increasingly worsen. This has resulted in negative consequences for the world economy, partly causing international food price spikes and social upheavals. In this paper we present statistical findings along with a preliminary version of an original agent-based model called the Dawe Global Security Model that simulates the global food market and the political fragility of countries. The model simulates the effects of food insecurity on international food prices and how these, coupled with national political fragility and international food trade can, in turn, increase the probability of food riots in countries. The agents in the model are the 213 countries of the world whose characteristics reflect empirical data and the international trade of food is also simulated based on real trade partnerships and data. The model has been informed, calibrated and validated using real data and the results of these procedures are presented in the paper. To further test the model we also present the model's forecasts for the near future in terms of food prices and incidence of food riots. The Dawe Global Security Model can be used to test scenarios on the evolution of shocks to global food production and analyse consequences for food riots. Further developments of the model can include national responses to food crises to investigate how countries can influence the spread of global food crises.
Introduction
Food security, here defined as the global availability of food capable of meeting global food demand, has become one of the main priorities of the international political agenda following the 2008 global food crisis, which exposed the fragilities of the current structure of the international food system and which had severe consequences for poverty and conflict around the world. The 2008 global food crisis is indeed a clear example of how localised food production shocks can travel through networks and have important consequences for the global economy, which can generate reinforcing feedbacks that result in widespread political fragility and, in particular, food riots. This crisis was part of a globalised, multi-system crisis, recently called 'Synchronous Failure' (Homer-Dixon et al. 2015) , and is a new type of crisis which involves failures within different parts of the Socio-Ecological System, which synchronise and can cause social unrest and fragility.
The interconnectedness of the global food system through international trade entails both positive and negative consequences for global food security. Positive in terms of providing food supplies to countries that cannot grow enough food to feed their own populations, and negative in terms of the possibility of shocks to propagate through the global food supply chain, causing disruptions in different countries. On this last point, Puma et al. (2015) and the report by Bailey et al. (2015) found that the high interconnectivity of the global food system makes it vulnerable to self-propagating disruptions in case of a climaterelated extreme event and that interconnectivity on the trade network is growing, with countries increasingly relying on food imported from a few large producer-exporters.
Studies on global food security usually focus on solutions to provide a future balance between consumption and supply of food (Rosegrant and Cline 2003; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007; Godfray et al. 2010; Anderson 2010; Calzadilla et al. 2011) , which is a reductionist perspective of food security. A comprehensive account of how shocks to global production of food propagate through the international food system to give life to political instability and food riots is missing. Puma et al. (2015) are the first to attempt to evaluate the resilience of the global food system, although their research only implemented a global network analysis and did not explore the consequences of food insecurity in terms of national political fragility and food riots. Raleigh et al. (2015) went further by assessing and modelling the feedbacks between conflict, food prices and climate change, but their research only focused on African countries, and hence their findings cannot be generalised.
Future projections on climate change that are expected to worsen global food insecurity (Rosegrant and Cline 2003; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007; Maxwell et al. 2010; Godfray et al. 2010; Huang et al. 2011; Berazneva and Lee 2013; Wheeler and von Braun 2013) , alongside more common international food price spikes (Berazneva and Lee 2013) and more frequent food riots (Smith 2014 ) make these interactions worth exploring with a systemic approach to test the consequences of what-if scenarios and possible policy interventions. Puma et al. (2015) call for further research in the dynamics of the system and possibly i n syst em ic risk, as do other aut hors (Schweitzer et al. 2009; Wheeler and von Braun 2013; Raleigh et al. 2015) . In fact, quantitative research in the global food security field is scarce and the authors that have used a quantitative approach mainly implemented econometric techniques (e.g. Berazneva and Lee 2013 or Raleigh et al. 2015) , which lack the possibility of introducing and evaluating the effects of feedbacks between food security, the international economy and the occurrence of food riots.
One effective methodology that can start to disentangle the several relationships that characterise the complexity of the global food system is computer simulation. Only specific sectors and dynamics of the food system have been modelled in the past. Research particularly focused on technology diffusion (e.g. Purvis et al. 1995) , land-use change (e.g. Loibl and Toetzer 2003) , impacts of climate change (e.g. Naylor et al. 2007) , policy analysis and testing (e.g. Waddell 2000) , consequences of changes in crop yield (e.g. Coble et al. 2000) and the dynamics of the agricultural system more in general (e.g. Pasqualino et al. 2015) .
Several modelling approaches are available. We chose Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) as it allows reproduction of the details of the complex dynamics characterising socio-ecological systems better than existing alternatives (Gilbert and Terna 2000; Gilbert 2008; Thiele et al. 2011; Railsback and Grimm 2012; Filatova et al. 2013) . ABM has been used in the agricultural sector to model technology diffusion (e.g. Berger 2001 ), micro-scale market dynamics (e.g. Arsenault et al. 2012) , scenario and policy testing (e.g. Bastardie et al. 2010) , land use change (e.g. Zhang et al. 2013) , decision-making (e.g. Ng et al. 2011) and land price dynamics (e.g. Filatova et al. 2009) . A systemic view of how food production shocks can translate into an increased probability of the occurrence of food riots in the world is missing from current literature, which is the gap that is addressed by this paper.
The novelty of this research lies in the systemic approach adopted and in the development of a tool that can be of future use to test the consequences of food production shocks in terms of social unrest. In this paper we present the update of a quantitative analysis on some of the drivers of food riots previously published in Natalini et al. (2015) and the structure of a novel ABM called the Dawe Global Security Model (DGSM), its calibration with the recent global food crisis, validation and future forecasts. The main aim of the DGSM is to model the dynamics that lead from international food security to the occurrence of food riots. This model represents a first attempt to simulate the complex dynamics that lead from global production shocks to the occurrence of food riots. In particular, the purpose of the model is to simulate how scarcity of food, its international price and national political fragility influence the probability of food riots in countries, also accounting for international food trade. The ultimate aim of the DGSM is to analyse the possible impacts of climate-related food production shocks and how these reverberate through the system, particularly focussing on the occurrence of food riots in countries. Although the ABM is still at a preliminary stage of development, its validation has led to promising results and we present forecasts for the year 2017. To model the relationship between the international price of food, national political fragility and food riots we extensively drew on the results from Natalini et al. (2015) updating their results by extending their research both in time and geographically.
In the next section of this paper we present the current literature on the topics discussed in this paper. Section 3 will introduce the updated analysis on the relationship between food prices, fragility and food riots based on Natalini et al. (2015) . The fourth section will present the ABM and how the analysis presented in the previous section has been incorporated in the model. Section 5 will present the 2017 forecast for food riots and finally we will present our conclusions in Section 6.
Food insecurity and food riots
The global food system is a complex system of interrelated sectors such as physical (e.g. production of food), social (e.g. consumption of food), economic (e.g. price of food) and political (e.g. policies for food systems). Changes in one sector can potentially have severe consequences for one or more of the others. A growing body of research has been dedicated to the study of these complex interactions and evidenced the existence of a vicious cycle between conflict, high international prices of food and food insecurity (Devereux and Maxwell 2001; Auyero and Moran 2007; Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Raleigh et al. 2015) .
The main drivers of food insecurity are long-term social trends such as an increasing global population, environmental and climatic changes and international conflict (Godfray et al. 2010; Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Calzadilla et al. 2011; Berazneva and Lee 2013; Puma et al. 2015) , which are expected to increase in the future hence worsening the conditions of global food insecurity.
Previous literature explored the possible consequences of food (in)security, particularly highlighting a positive relationship between global scarcity of food and increases in international food prices (Godfray et al. 2010; Raleigh et al. 2015; Puma et al. 2015) , but also between global scarcity of food and increased probability of conflict (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Raleigh et al. 2015) . Other authors also argued that food insecurity increases the chances of democratic breakdown in politically fragile countries (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011) .
At the same time, high international food prices can impact food security (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Berazneva and Lee 2013; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013; Bellemare 2014; Smith 2014; Raleigh et al. 2015) and the political stability of countries (Seddon and Walton 1994; Arezki and Bruckner 2011; Bates 2011; Berazneva and Lee 2013) , also causing political changes at the national level (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011) .
The vicious cycle between food insecurity, international prices and unrest depicted above was clearly evident during the most recent wave of food riots. These events may have initially been motivated by issues around lack of access to food, which then transformed into a generalised dissent and discontent with the current establishment (O'Brien 2012). Indeed, food riots are widely believed to negatively affect the political stability of countries (Crawley et al. 2012) and that the political instability and unrest created can spread to neighbouring countries (Lagi et al. 2011 ) and through networks (Puma et al. 2015) . Goldstone (2011) , for instance, argued that these events can trigger larger grievances such as civil wars, as in the case for the French Revolution and the Arab Spring.
Food riots have been defined as Bviolent, collective unrest leading to a loss of control, bodily harm or damage to property, essentially motivated by a lack of food availability, accessibility or affordability, as reported by the international and local media, and which may include other underlying causes of discontent^(Barbet-Gros and Cuesta Food riots: From definition to operationalization. Unpublished manuscript). Although the 2008 global food crisis triggered increased research on the interconnections between scarcity of food, international food prices and food riots, violent uprisings related to the price of food or scarcity thereof had been occurring for the past four centuries (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Berazneva and Lee 2013; Smith 2014; Demarest 2014) .
Since 2008 research has thus been focusing on the drivers of food riots, which notably are food insecurity (Lagi et al. 2011; Crawley et al. 2012 ) and high international food prices (Hendrix et al. 2009; Lagi et al. 2011; Gaub 2012; Crawley et al. 2012; Bellemare 2014; Smith 2014; Bleischwitz et al. 2014; Natalini et al. 2015) . However, the literature about the most recent (twentyfirst century) food riots found that food insecurity and high international food prices are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for food-related unrest to happen. Indeed, some authors argued that international prices for food rarely translate perfectly into national prices for the same commodities (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Smith 2014; Raleigh et al. 2015) , although Smith (2014) still found a positive relationship between a sudden increase in domestic food prices and urban unrest. Several authors argue that countries are more likely to experience food riots where there are food production shocks (e.g. King et al. 2015) or if a country is a net food importer (e.g. Lagi et al. 2011) . However, these arguments are challenged by part of the literature. For instance, Buhaug et al. (2015) found no evidence of a link between reduced agricultural output and an increase in the incidence of food riots in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Natalini et al. (2015) did not find a positive relationship between national food scarcity and the occurrence of food riots. This opinion is shared by other authors who believe that scarcity of food is not a direct cause of food riots, but rather a catalyst (e.g. Sneyd et al. 2013) . Finally, several authors found that food riots are more likely to occur in countries that are already politically fragile (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Natalini et al. 2015) .
The research on the drivers of food riots is comprehensive, but findings are contradictory and the methodologies implemented were not always appropriate. For instance, Lagi et al. (2011) identified a threshold on the price of food as captured by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Food Price Index (FAO FPI) over which food riots are more likely to occur. This was set at 210 for the nominal version of the index. However, as highlighted by Natalini et al. (2015) the database of food riots used by Lagi et al. (2011) was inaccurate and the quantitative tests implemented inappropriate. In addition, the paper was never published in an academic peerreviewed journal. Bellemare (2014) investigated both food price increases and food price volatility as possible causes of food riots. His results show no significant connection between food price volatility and the occurrence of food riots, whereas food price increases significantly affect this type of event, also providing causal evidence between the first two dynamics. However, an in-depth review of the article raised concerns on the author's database on food riots, in particular, this could not be reproduced as it was collected through newspaper search engines that required an academic subscription, and, in addition, these databases add and remove entire newspapers at their own discretion, making the reproduction of the author's database (and hence results) difficult. Finally, Natalini et al. (2015) evaluated some of the drivers of food riots that occurred in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia regions between 2005 and 2011. The authors found that national scarcity of food does not significantly impact the occurrence of food riots, as opposed to international food prices, whose relationship with food riots was significant. In particular, the authors found a methodologically robust threshold for the FAO FPI over which food riots are more likely to occur. This was set at 148 for the deflated version of the index. However, the database of food riots used in that study presented geographical and time constraints. The first part of the research presented in the next section of this paper hence constitutes a geographic and time update of the paper of the paper of Natalini et al. (2015) .
An update of the food, price and fragility nexus
Since the aim of the DGSM was to recreate the dynamics that could lead to an increase in the probability of food riots for countries and possibly forecast them, we used the findings from Natalini et al. (2015) to inform this part of the model. In particular, the research found that food riots are more likely to occur when the Food and Agriculture Organisations' Food Price Index (FAO FPI) (FAO, 2015) went beyond a threshold of 148. However, this research only covered the period 2005-2011 and was limited to countries in Africa, Middle-East and Asia. We thus updated their database of food riots to 2013 also including all the areas of the world and reran their econometric tests to find a more accurate threshold for the FAO FPI.
Using the definition of food riots presented in the previous section (the same as used by Natalini et al. (2015) ), we carried out a simple keyword search to find newspaper articles in English that met the definition of food riots. To add more entries to the database we also used the database on food riots developed by the Food Price Crisis Observatory from the World Bank (WB 2015a), assuming that their records were correct. The manual search for online media articles was preferred to the use of larger, online media repositories because we wish our research to be publicly available, openaccess and easy to replicate. Data gathered through online repositories is often protected by copyright and their use is restricted to academic institutions that hold a valid licence. It is also important to note at this stage the limitations of our data collection methodology. Our database is indeed deemed to be partially incomplete as our search was only carried out in English and on online newspapers. Therefore, local food riots that were not large enough to be reported, or that were only reported in local printed newspapers or that were reported in a language different from English, would not have been captured in our database. In addition, the use of a strict definition of food riots and a keyword search will miss cases of instability and riots where food price inflation plays a role, yet where it is not specifically mentioned in media reports. Despite these important limitations, our database still retains the largest number of violent food riots recorded amongst the databases reviewed for our analysis (e.g. Food Price Crisis Observatory). Figure 1 presents the updated database of food riots in the form of a timeline. These data arranged in a table are also available in Appendix 1 Table 5 with references and are graphically displayed alongside the deflated version of the FAO FPI in Fig. 2 .
Using this new set of data we estimated a logistic random effects model on a panel dataset with all the countries over the timeframe [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . As found by Natalini et al. (2015) the maximum likelihood estimations resulted in a highly significant positive coefficient for the deflated FAO FPI (Table 1) . We also recalculated the threshold above which countries start to experience food riots which was 140, slightly lower than the one found by the authors, but, due to the larger database we have used in this paper, more accurate. More precisely, the 140 threshold represents the deflated FAO FPI value above which the probability for a random country to experience a food riot is >1%.
As pointed out in the previous section, food riots do not depend exclusively on the international price of food, but also on other complex dynamics. In particular, Natalini et al. (2015) found that food riots are more likely to happen in countries that are already highly fragile. In that paper the authors tested different indices of political fragility and found that the index that performed best at predicting food riots was the Political Stability and Absence of Violence from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by the World Bank (WB 2015c). Once updated, the authors' database of food riots and a more accurate threshold for the FAO FPI found, we reran their Hazard model to verify whether the WGI still was a good predictor of food riots in countries. For the purpose of this analysis, countries that experienced more than one food riot during the time frame selected have been counted once. The periods when the deflated version of the FAO FPI was above the 140 threshold were the following: i) August 2007-September 2008 that corresponds to 15 months and 27 food riots (as India experienced more than one food riot in the period considered); ii) November 2009 -February 2010 that corresponds to 4 months and no food riots; iii) July 2010 -November 2014 (beyond the period considered for this analysis, so our analysis only considered July 2010 -December 2013) that corresponds to 42 months and 20 food riots. We hence analysed the periods 2007-2008 and 2010-2013 as these were the only timeframes when the FAO FPI was above the threshold and food riots occurred. Since the results from the Hazard model run on both periods were very similar, here we report only those for the period 2010-2013. Differently from Natalini et al. (2015) we decided to use national data from the first year (i.e. 2010) rather than data averaged for the two (or more) years, as this is more common practice in the use of Hazard models.
In Table 2 we present the results from the second period, which fundamentally confirm those found by Natalini et al. (2015) . Whether a country is a net cereals importer or exporter does not seem to significantly impact the occurrence of food riots. Conversely, even with a longer period of analysis and a larger food riots database the WGI is a good predictor of food riots in countries and hence we used this measure to calculate the political fragility of the countries in the DGSM. Figure 3 shows the Hazard Ratios for the WGI.
The Dawe global security agent-based model
One of the main characteristics of ABMs is the possibility of simulating a system while including interactions between micro (i.e. national, country-level in this case) and macro (i.e. global) levels of analysis. This was particularly important to our research as the system recreated in the model is made of individual agents (countries) whose decisions (in this case production, consumption and trade of food) have international consequences in terms of global availability of cereals and hence international prices, which in turn have national consequences in terms of occurrence of national food riots. The ABM that we present in this paper is empirically grounded, meaning that all the data fed into the model as well as the parameters used have been informed using real data. In particular, we used the updated analysis from Natalini et al. (2015) presented in the previous section of the paper to inform some of the key dynamics in the DGSM. In particular, in the DGSM the occurrence of food riots mainly depends on the level of the international price of food as estimated by the FAO FPI (i.e. either above or below the 140 threshold) and on the political fragility of countries as estimated by the WGI. Also, the DGSM was built to give short-term (5 years) predictions. The DGSM is structured around four main elements: i) characteristics of countries; ii) international trade of cereals; iii) international price of food; iv) food riot dynamics. These elements will be introduced individually and then we will provide a brief summary of the dynamics as they occur inside the DGSM.
Characteristics of the countries
In our model each agent represents a country, with 213 countries in total. The model simulation starts in 2005 and we used real data available for that year to inform countries' characteristics. The data that has been used to inform the characteristics of the countries come from the Global Resource Observatory (GRO) project, which holds a collection of data sourced from trusted open-source databases such as the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations and further manipulated by the researchers from the Global Sustainability Institute to improve consistency and fill in the gaps. The full database is freely available on the institute's website (GSI 2015) . During the period simulated (i.e. the years from 2005 to 2013, which is the latest year for which data are available) three new countries were constituted (i.e. Montenegro in 2006; Kosovo in 2008; South Sudan in 2011) and these countries are added in the model the year after they had been founded using real data for that year.
Projections for consumption and production of cereals for each country have been calculated on real data available for the period 2005-2013 by fitting polynomial regression trendlines to the data points available. The production and consumption data are therefore smoothed to provide production and consumption trends in each country. Therefore, significant production shocks are not present in these trends and needed to be added exogenously to the model to recreate real world events where they have occurred (e.g. the 2007/2008 production losses).
At the beginning of the simulation, countries were also given cereal stocks using data from the GRO database (GSI 2015) . These stocks were replaced at the end of each year with the leftover internal availability of cereals for each country.
Countries were also provided with stock-to-use ratios (SURs), which we kept constant throughout the simulation. These have been calculated for each country by averaging the ratio between stocks and consumption for each year also using data from the GRO database (GSI 2015). Fig. 3 Plot of the hazard ratios for WGI, where the hazard ratios are plotted on the y-axis and WGI on the x-axis. The shaded areas represent the σ and 2σ probability intervals, respectively
International trade of cereals
The countries in our ABM are embedded in a social network that recreates international trade of cereals. Real data have also been used to inform these links and have been sourced from the United Nations Comtrade database (UN 2014). Since the staple that is most traded in the world is wheat, we decided to use data for international trade of wheat as a proxy for cereals traded in the world. A further enhancement of the model would be to explore the main traded crops (wheat, maize, rice and soybean) separately to better model trade links -in particular those within Asia (rice) and those from Latin America (soybean). The links created among countries reflect real international food trade exchanges based on wheat. The network was initialised on data for 2005 and its subsequent evolution was based on the logic of keeping existing links when possible and seeking new ones at random when the supply from existing links became insufficient.
The international trade of cereals has arbitrarily been split into two rounds, the first one with countries importing what they need to cover their current consumption, and the second one to cover their need of restocking (i.e. build up national reserves of cereals). In the first round, following the calculation that decides whether countries are net food importers or exporters, the importing countries use their existing links to find potential exporting countries to trade with and import 10% of what they need from each of them. This is to avoid depletion of a country's stock by one single country. If their current pool of partners cannot meet the importing country's cereals demand, then they will select a random country they don't already have a link with that still has cereals stocks available and import from it. This procedure continues until either the import needs for each country are satisfied or until the exports available in the world are finished.
Before the second round of exchanges, countries compute their desired cereal stock by multiplying their SUR for their consumption and use their leftover internal availability of cereals to satisfy this. If not sufficient, countries will import what they need from the other countries following the same procedure as during the first round. This procedure continues until either the restocking needs for each country are satisfied or until the exports available in the world are finished.
International price of food and food riots
Based on the research from Natalini et al. (2015) and our updated results we included international food price dynamics in the model as two regimes, either above or below the threshold of 140. This decision was also due to the aim of the model being not to recreate the perfect formation of the FAO FPI, but rather to include as many conditions necessary for the model to reproduce the occurrence of food riots in countries as possible.
The model was calibrated using the real series of world food prices, which showed a below-threshold level from 2005 to 2007, a first spike above the threshold in 2008, a return of the prices below the threshold in 2009, and finally four consecutive years above the threshold from 2010 to 2013. The aim of the calibration was to reproduce this series using the model data for global production, consumption and stocks of food and real data for international food price regimes (i.e. either above or below the threshold). It is worth noting here that the aim of the DGSM was not to investigate and model the formation of international prices, rather to model some of the dynamics that lead to the occurrence of food riots. Although the presence of an international price for food is essential in the DGSM at its current stage of development, the dynamics of price formation are not and have therefore been simplified.
For the calibration of international food prices, an Evolutionary Tree (ET) model was fitted to the data from the model using the ratio between Global Cereals Production and Global Cereals Consumption and Global Cereals Stocks as independent variables and the real series of price regimes between 2005 and 2014 as target variable. This was implemented using the R package evtree (Grubinger et al. 2014 ) and the results are presented in Fig. 4 .
The results from the ET perfectly recreate the international price regime for the period considered and show intuitive dynamics between the trends in global ratio and stocks for cereals and international price regime. In particular, when the ratio between global production and consumption of cereals is smaller than 0.996637, the international price of food is above the threshold. For any ratio larger or equal to 0.996637, global stocks of cereals become significant and, in particular, when these are smaller than 132,529.72 (1000 MT), the price climbs above the threshold, and below otherwise.
Food riot dynamics
To translate the findings from Natalini et al. (2015) and our updated results in a format that could be used as dynamics in the ABM and to further test whether the international price of food (as captured by the FAO FPI) and the fragility of a country (as estimated by the WGI) are significant variables in determining whether a country is more likely to experience a food riot, we used a Regression Tree Random Effects Model provided by the R package REEMtree (Sela and Simonoff 2011) . This instrument is highly recommended when trying to find patterns or categories in given variables and implement the findings in an ABM (Sánchez-Maroño et al. 2015) . We added two new discrete variables to our database, one that classifies each record either below or above the 140 price threshold and another that divides the countries into four homogenous categories of fragility (i.e. high, medium-high, medium-low, low) according to their WGI estimate for each year. We then ran the REEMtree model using the variable food riots as dependent and the two newly created discrete variables as independent to find different combinations of price regime and fragility that lead to different probabilities for countries to experience food riots. The results of the model are presented in Fig. 5 .
The model assigns a basic probability of experiencing a food riot (i.e. the intercept) which is the same for all the countries (and that, in our case, was very close to zero). In addition the model provides probabilities according to different combinations of the values for the independent variables: the estimates showed that both variables were significant in determining whether a country will experience a food riot or not. In particular, countries with low and medium-low fragility have the same probability of experiencing a food riot, whereas countries in the more fragile categories have a different probability depending on whether the price is above or below the threshold. The model also assigns to each country a unique probability of experiencing a food riot (i.e. the random effects) that can be found in Appendix 2 Table 6 . The final probability for each country to experience a food riot is thus the sum of the intercept, the probability resulting from the tree combinations of fragility and price and random effects.
To implement the findings from this section in the ABM, we needed to provide an estimate for the WGI for each country. Since this index is an agglomerate of several different indices and measures (WB 2015b), it could not be recreated endogenously. This is also because the purpose of modelling is to better understand one or more dynamics of the real world, often too complex to be comprehended by simply observing the system. It is hence essential to isolate the conditions for that dynamic to happen and simulate only those. Failing to do so might result in a model that is too complex to understand hence defeating the original purpose of modelling itself. For this reason we used the same approach used to simulate the production and the consumption of food for each country, Fig. 4 ET model on data from the DGSM using ratio between 'Global Cereals Production' and 'Global Cereals Consumption' and the variable 'Global Cereals Stock' as independent variables and the variable 'Price threshold' as target variable simply by fitting trend lines to the data points we had available for the WGI estimates for each country for each year over the period 1995-2013.
Introducing exogenous production shocks
As trend lines were used to calculate the production function within the DGSM, we required exogenous production shocks to be reintroduced in the model exogenously. These production shocks were derived from real world data. In particular, a significant price shock was observed in 2007/08 in global food as depicted in Fig. 6 . Food production around this time was significantly impacted by several factors ). However, two major food production shock events occurred before the price shock of 2007/08 -in 2002/03 and 2006. During 2002/03 food stocks globally were at an all-time high. This was mainly due to high stock levels in China and the production shock happened to coincide with the time when China had decided to strategically reduce its stock levels. Therefore, this food production shock was delayed as stocks entered international trade. (Headey and Fan 2010) . We therefore took the average food production shock in the major food producing countries as our basis for our exogenous shock.
To calculate the food production shocks in 2002, 2003 and 2006 we first fit best fitted lines per country to production data between 2000 and 2013 for the major grains (wheat, maize and rice) (Jones and Phillips 2016) . This was done for each of the main country producers of those three grains, which represented 75% of global production. These best fit lines were then subtracted from production to remove the overall growth in production which characterised the food system. This growth matched the increase in demand from changing diets and a growing population. A percentage anomaly per year per country was then calculated away from this best fit line by dividing by the production for that country. Table 3 shows these country anomalies for each year and the average for the years 2002, 2003 and 2007 . These average production shocks were then taken to create our best estimate of the cumulative size of the production shock that caused the food price shock in 2007/08. The sum of these production shocks represented an overall global food production shock of 8%.
Summary of the dynamics included in the DGSM
To further clarify the sequence of the processes that countries included in the DGSM go through, we provide a brief summary of one run of the simulations. The simulation starts with countries producing and consuming cereals, and countries compute whether they are net cereals exporters or importers by adding their current production to their stocks from the previous year and then subtracting their own current consumption. The leftover cereals available are summed to obtain a global figure of cereal availability and national consumptions are also summed to obtain a figure for global cereal consumption. According to these global figures and two parameters calculated through the calibration of the model, the international price of food is set either above or below the 140 FAO FPI threshold. Countries subsequently trade to cover both their leftover consumption and need for stocks of cereals. They then calculate their level of political fragility as given by the WGI. According to this estimate, the international price of food and to their own probability of experiencing food riots, they will have different probabilities of experiencing a food riot that year. At the end of the year, the leftover cereals become national stocks that will be carried over to the next year. This process is repeated each year.
Validation of the DGSM
Models that aim at producing meaningful predictions for future events need to be validated, also to facilitate their replicability (Squazzoni 2012) . As mentioned before, the DGSM is empirically grounded, which means that we used real data to generate the characteristics of the countries and we informed parameters and relationships with statistical and econometric tests carried out on real data from past events. This means that the model is internally validated (Squazzoni 2012) . To further test whether the dynamics included in the DGSM were sufficient to recreate the occurrence of food riots we analysed the data produced from the model in the period 2005-2013 and In order to validate the DGSM, 100 simulations were run and analysed. Firstly, the simulated cumulative probability of food riots to happen in the years below (i.e. 2005-2007 and 2009 ) and above (2008 and 2010-2013) the 140 FAO FPI threshold were calculated and compared with the real cumulative probability during those periods. The simulated probability for the below-threshold period was 0.06 whereas the real probability was 0.02. For the above-threshold period, the simulated probability was 0.17, whereas the real probability was 0.22. Although the DGSM overestimates countries' probability to experience a food riot when the international price of food is below the threshold and underestimates their probability when the price is high, the probabilities are remarkably similar when aggregated by price regime. Figure 7 plots the number of food riots per year as they occurred in reality and as predicted by the DGSM, alongside the confidence interval for the simulated results. The 2008 peak plotted in both lines is proof that the ABM correctly represents a higher probability of the occurrence of food riots in that year, and, although the absolute number of food riots per year is underestimated by the model, the lines follow the same pattern. Interestingly, the model failed to fully capture the second peak of food riots that occurred in 2011 and tended instead to spread the riots that occurred in 2011 over a four-year period also covering 2010, 2012 and 2013.
To further investigate the results from the DGSM, the list of countries with the highest probability of food riots throughout the whole period as simulated in the model and the database of food riots presented in Section 3 were compared to evaluate the accuracy of the DGSM at predicting which countries experienced food riots in the time frame considered. The simulated probabilities ranged between 0% and 9% with the lowest probability assigned to Australia and the highest to India. In particular, 70% of the countries that fell within the top 10 countries most at risk of experiencing a food riot as calculated by the DGSM experienced a food riot. This percentage remains unvaried for the top 20 countries most at risk and 63% for the top 40. Table 3 Food production anomaly (percentage of overall production) away from best fit line for the three major grains (wheat, maize and rice) between 2000 and 2010 in major food producing countries. The average losses per country for the major production shock events (2002, 2003 and 2006) Indonesia The accuracy of the DGSM was investigated further by evaluating the predictions for both year and country for each food riot resulting from the ABM simulations. In order to do this, an R (R Core Team 2013) script calculating the percentage match between real and simulated food riots was run. The script first calculated the overall accuracy of the model (i.e. at predicting both countries that did experience a food riot during a given year and countries that did not), the percentage of correctly predicted food riots in each country for each year and finally the percentage of false food riots predicted (i.e. food riots predicted by the model in a certain country during a given year that did not occur in reality). This was done for each of the 100 runs of the DGSM and the average results are presented in Table 4 .
The validation based on the probabilities per year shows that the model captures important dynamics that c a u s e f o o d r i o t s a t t h e l a rg e r s c a l e , a l t h o u g h underestimating the total number of food riots per price regime. In addition, the analysis on countries that are predicted to experience a food riot at any point during the time frame considered led to remarkably accurate results. However, the validation on the DGSM's predictions for year and country for each food riot shows that the model is not fully able to capture the specific year during which each country experiences a food riot and can hence be improved. It is worth noting here that the DGSM, similarly to any other computer model, is not aimed at giving (cannot provide) precise predictions about which country will experience a food riot and when, but rather it is aimed at giving an indication about which countries are at risk of social upheavals due to multiple factors, amongst which we find a high international price of food and their political fragility. Further developments of the model may hence include a broader range of influencing factors along with revised internal dynamics to fully capture internal feedback effects. These updates to the model will be explored in more detail in the Conclusions Section.
Forecasting 2017 food riots
In order to provide forecasts for the future of food riots, 100 simulations of the DGSM were run and the results for food riots for the year 2017 were analysed. This year was selected because it is the first year in the future at the time of writing this paper (i.e. March 2016) and, in addition, the ABM was built to provide short term forecasts for the 5-10 years after the last year used to calibrate the models, which in this case was 2013.
The results from the DGSM for the international price regimes suggest that both food and fuel prices are likely to be above the threshold in 2017, thus increasing the probability of the occurrence of food and fuel riots during this year. However, the predictions for the international price regime need to be taken with reservations as mentioned in Section BAn update of the food, price and fragility nexus^.
Out of all the years considered, 2017 had one of the highest probability for a random country to experience a food riot, which was around 4% as compared to 1% in 2005 (i.e. the year with the simulated lowest probability of food riots) and 3% in 2008 (i.e. the year that registered the largest number of food riots in reality). The probabilities of food riots for countries for the year 2017 ranged between 0% and 17%, with the highest probability assigned to Turkey. In the top 10 countries most at risk we find Turkey, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Iran, Lao, Thailand, Algeria, Mauritania and Nigeria, with probabilities spanning between 17% and 13%. Thirty countries were assigned with the lowest probability, amongst these we find Austria, Belgium and Iceland. For a better visualisation, the results from the food riots forecast for 2017 from the DGSM are presented in Fig. 8 .
The countries that top the list with the largest forecast probability of experiencing a food riot in 2017 differ in their political situation and with regard to their history of food riots. The four main variables that define the probability for a country to experience a food riot are: i) the intercept identified by the REEMtree model (equal for all countries); ii) whether the FAO FPI is above the threshold (equal for all countries); iii) the WGI group of fragility for the country and iv) the country-specific randomeffects assigned by the REEMtree model based on a country's history of food riots. The intercept and random-effects assigned by the REEMtree model are very small, which means that, realistically, the only factors having a prominent effect on countries' probabilities for food riots are the price regime (either above or below the 140 threshold) and a country's WGI group. As mentioned above, to limit the complexity at this stage of development of the model, countries' estimates for the WGI are calculated according to the trend lines calculated on data available between 1995 and 2013. The countries that top the list of probability of food riots for 2017 all show an increasing trend in the data for the WGI in the period considered. Therefore, the trend lines applied to the data result in high WGI estimates for these countries in 2017. It is worth remembering at this point that the WGI is an aggregated index of political fragility of countries, which summarises the information for several different variables and expert opinions, as listed in WB (2015b). Finally, the FAO FPI is forecast to be above the threshold for 2017, hence causing the probability of countries with high levels of fragility to increase significantly (see Fig. 5 ). These reasons explain the diversity between the countries that top the list of probability of food riots for 2017.
Conclusions
Global food security is increasingly becoming a concern for the international policy arena, particularly because of the possible consequences of climate-related extreme events that can negatively affect the production of food in some key regions of the world. Due to the high interconnectedness of the global food system, such production shocks can have negative impacts on the international economy and political fragility of countries, making this subject worth further investigation using a systemic approach. The transmission from production shocks to instability via prices supposedly occurs through national subsidies for food prices. Indeed, some authors argue that another main cause of food riots, particularly during the 2008 global food crisis, was the effective or prospected removal of food subsidies (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011) . The newspaper articles gathered to compile the databases of food and fuel riots used in this research often mentioned as one of the causes of the violent protests either the effective or threatened removal of food subsidies. Developed, developing and low-income countries normally subsidise the prices of food and energy resources to ensure their affordability, especially when prices increase (IMF 2008; Hendrix et al. 2009 ). However, these constitute an onerous expenditure when the price of imported goods spikes, especially for poor countries. It is hence credible to believe that once the price of food crosses a certain threshold due to either a food production shock or a disruption in the international food supply chain, poor countries decide to cut subsidies, causing grievances from the populations which can turn into (food) riots. This threshold is set at 140 for the deflated, annual version of the FAO FPI, as found in this paper. Our findings also confirm that, as previously found by Natalini et al. (2015) , national food security does not significantly impact the occurrence of food riots as opposed to international food prices and national political fragility. In this paper we also present a first attempt to model the complexity of the global food system, focusing on global food availability, international trade of cereals, the interaction with international price of food and the rise of social conflict, mainly in the form of food riots. We developed an Agent-Based Model (ABM) called the Dawe Global Security Model (DGSM) to simulate the complex dynamics of the system, also providing forecasts for food riots for the year 2017.
The validation of the model shows that the DGSM is able to capture the general conditions that cause food riots to occur. In particular, the model results show a good level of accuracy whilst predicting probability of riots when the price is above/below the threshold and for countries' probability of experiencing a food riot at any point during the time frame considered. The DGSM forecast an international food price regime above the threshold for the year 2017 and identified Turkey, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Iran, Lao, Thailand, Algeria, Mauritania and Nigeria as the countries most at risk of food riots. As highlighted before, the DGSM cannot provide precise predictions for which countries will experience a food riot in the future. Its forecasts should be used as an indication as to which countries require further attention and more in-depth research on critical national fragilities. Indeed, whether a country will experience a food riot depends on a long list of different factors, most of which still have to be identified, and on the governments' responses to such criticalities. The model can, however, be used to identify some of these criticalities, such as countries' political fragility, their history of food riots and the international food price regime.
The findings from our quantitative and simulation studies seem to indicate that national food insecurity does not directly translate into that country's higher probability of food riots. Rather, our model simulates how national food production shocks (i.e. food insecurity) can result in a spike in the international price of food, which in turn can cause food riots in countries far from where the crisis originated. This reasoning fits with the increasingly accepted acknowledgment that food security, and, more in general, scarcity of natural resources, is not a direct cause of conflict, but rather a stressor or catalyst (e.g. Homer-Dixon 1999; OECD 2012; Raleigh et al. 2015) . As highlighted by our results presented in Section 3, the political fragility of countries is a critical factor in the evaluation of countries' probability for experiencing food riots, which is in line with current literature (e.g. Natalini et al. 2015; Brinkman and Hendrix 2011) . Commenting on our findings in the wider context of the 2008 global food crisis, the results from our research support the analysis that the crisis was caused by multiple stressors and that connected different socio-ecological systems, namely the food, energy and finance sectors (Homer-Dixon et al. 2015) . Food insecurity is indeed portrayed by HomerDixon et al. (2015) as only one of the several factors that caused the crisis seen in the food socio-ecological system in 2008, which was facilitated by the high (and increasing) interconnectivity and synchronisation of the system. Synchronous failures are forecast to become more frequent in the future, which is why our research on empirical simulation of the food system is more relevant than ever.
This said, further developments are needed to reduce the current underestimation of the total number of food riots per year when a shock occurs and improve the prediction accuracy at the country level. The validation and analysis of the results from the DGSM suggested several potential directions for further research. Firstly, the underestimation of the number of food riots is probably due to the fact that the causes of food riots can be several and varied, ranging from a wider economic distress of a country, to problems in the internal redistribution of food and also the interaction with other political, social and economic situations. However, the statistical predictors for food riots currently included in the model are limited to the price of food and the political fragility of countries. To improve the accuracy of the model, future versions could disaggregate the category 'cereals' into the different main grains and focus on diets. This broad category could conceal great variability, as different grains are key staples for different countries. Populations may be more or less willing to riot according to what grain is scarce or too expensive. In addition, the model currently only includes a threshold on the absolute level of food prices, which identifies both years with high and low numbers of food riots. Future versions of the model could focus on price variations, which may be able to identify the years with the largest number of food riots with more accuracy.
Secondly, as for the prediction of food riots in the correct countries, the model at the moment only distinguishes between countries according to four categories of political fragility, which are rather wide. The only instrument included in the model that differentiates one country from another in terms of probability of food riots is the country-specific random effects estimated by the REEMtree model, which have a relatively minor impact on the overall probability of riot due to the low number of violent food riots.
A third possibility to improve the model performance is linked to the fact that, in its current version, the occurrence of food riots in countries does not have any consequence on other variables. In future versions of the model, further consequences of countries that experience food riots could be explored. This has been observed in countries such as Syria where rioting, which was one of the causal triggers in food protests, escalated into civil war, thereby having significant impact on food production. Another possible improvement to the model is to further investigate the causes that led each country to experience a food riot, or, more simply, refine how the political fragility is calculated in the model, maybe translating it to an endogenous process. Finally, the model does not currently exploit the ABM capabilities to the fullest. In particular, the possibility of creating emergent properties generated by the interaction between the countries and their individual decisions is limited by the trend lines that define their production and consumption. In future versions of the model, countries could make decisions based on their populations and other social or economic variables in terms of consumption and production of food, hence changing the dynamics of the model. Appendix 2 Random-effects assigned to each country as estimated by REEMtree 
